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1. Introduction
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), the policy that supports labour
unions (employers) in collective bargaining can be called labour market regu-
lation (deregulation). Nickell et al. (2005, pp. 6-7) report that unionization
has shown a downward trend for most OECD countries since the 1980s. Ace-
moglu et al. (2001) document that the US and UK experienced rapid labour
market deregulation in the years 1975-2000. They explain this development
by skill-biased technological change which increases the outside option of
skilled workers, undermining the coalition among skilled and unskilled work-
ers in support of unions. In this document, the same development is explained
by a political process in which workers and employers lobby policy makers
on labour market regulation.
Palokangas (2003) argues that distorting taxation would cause labour
market regulation. He constructs a political equilibrium in which employers
and workers bargain over wages and lobby the government for taxation and
labour market regulation. He shows that if it is much easier to tax wages
than profits, then the government protects union power by labour market
regulation. In contrast, this document introduces in-house research and de-
velopment (R&D) as an alternative cause of labour market regulation: firms
invest in R&D to escape labour costs due to high wages.
A number of empirical documents argue that international trade, in par-
ticular the possibility of outsourcing, causes declining union bargaining power
(cf. Abraham et al. 2009, Dumont at al. 2005, 2012, Boulhol et al. 2011). On
the other hand, Brock and Dobbelaere (2006) find little evidence of interna-
tional trade having an impact on the workers’ bargaining power. According
to Potrafke (2010), other explanations than globalization are required to por-
tray the development of labor market institutions. This document considers
an economy which is otherwise integrated except that the labour markets are
still regulated at the local level. Because a local policy maker controls only
a small proportion of the labour markers of the integrated economy, it has
only limited changes to exercise independent policy. This undermines the
benefits from lobbying for labour market regulation.
The growth effects of union power depend decisively on the structure of
the economy. Labour unions impose minimum wages that cause unemploy-
ment. If the same technology were used both in production and in R&D,
then union power would decrease profits, undermining incentives to invest in
productivity-enhancing R&D (cf. Peretto 2011). In that case, an increase in
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union wages raises unemployment but lowers the productivity growth rate.
There is, however, contrasting empirical evidence. Caballero (1993) and
Hoon and Phelps (1997) find a positive dependence between unemployment
and productivity growth. Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010) show that the an-
nual percentage growth of real wages has a positive effect on growth in value
added per labour hour. They conclude that flexible (i.e. deregulated) labour
markets can lead to a growth path that is associated with high employment,
but slow productivity growth.
Following Palokangas (1996, 2000, 2004), this document establishes a
positive dependence between unemployment and productivity growth by the
assumption that production and R&D are subject to different technology.
There are two categories of labour: key workers (called skilled labour, for
convenience) and ordinary workers (called unskilled labour), so that produc-
tion employs ordinary and R&D key workers more intensively. The minimum
wages that are determined by collective bargaining are effectively binding for
ordinary, but not necessarily for key workers. When those minimum wages
increase, firms lay out unskilled workers, but transfer skilled workers from
production to productivity-enhancing R&D to escape labour costs.
Without R&D, the workers and shareholders would obtain their highest
income in full employment, in which case the political process would lead
to labour market deregulation. With R&D, workers can have incentives
to lobby for labour market regulation: they can accept unemployment for
unskilled workers in exchange for higher prospective labour income. Labour
market regulation increases wages for unskilled workers, decreasing output
and transferring skilled workers from production to R&D. This promotes
R&D, raising productivity and prospective income.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 char-
acterizes the institutional structure of the economy. Sections 3, 4 and 5
construct the specific models of the households, final-good firms and inter-
mediate-good industries, respectively. Section 6 establishes a common agency
game where employers and workers lobby decision makers. Sections 7 and 8
construct the political equilibrium, on which the results are based.
2. The economy
Households supply land, skilled labour and unskilled labour inelastically.
The are two sectors: the high-tech sector, in which oligopolists employ skilled
and unskilled labour, producing intermediate goods and performing in-house
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R&D to escape labour costs, and the traditional sector which produces its
output from land.1 Investment in physical capital is ignored, because it would
excessively complicate the analysis. Households consume the products of the
oligopolists and the traditional sector, but it is equivalent to assume that
competitive firms produce the consumption good from these products.
It is a plausible to assert that skilled labour is more intensively used
in R&D than in production. Following many growth models (e.g. Romer
1990), this assertion is translated into an extreme specification in which only
skilled labour is devoted to R&D. This reduces the analysis of the dynamics
of this system to a system of equations that can be explicitly solved by doing
algebra. Presumably, the relaxation of the specification would not change
the basic dynamics of the model. The earnings of unskilled labour are called
wages and those of skilled labour salaries, for convenience.
In the economy, there is a large number (a “continuum”) of industries
that are placed evenly in the limit [0, 1], and a number n of equal but disjoint
jurisdictions, each of which implements common labour market regulations:
[0, 1] =
n⋃
k=1
Bk, Bk
⋂
Bζ = ∅ for k 6= ζ ,
1
n
.
=
∫
i∈Bk
di, (1)
where Bk is the set of industries belonging to jurisdiction k. Each industry
i ∈ [0, 1] is controlled by one oligopolist (labeled i) that produces a different
good (labeled i) and bargains over its wage with a labour union (labeled i)
that represents its workers.
Public policy can be endogenized either by direct majority voting (cf.
Saint-Paul 2002a, 2002b), or by lobbying. Majority voting is not applied in
this document, because the main interest focuses on the relative bargaining
power of employees and employers in the economy. Lobbying can be modeled
either by the all-pay auction model, in which the lobbyist making the greater
effort wins with certainty, or by the menu-auction model, in which the lobby-
ists announce their bids contingent on the politician’s actions. In the all-pay
auction model, lobbying expenditures are incurred by all the lobbyists before
the policy maker takes an action. This is the case e.g. when interest groups
1The traditional sector is introduced into the model only to ensure that there is a sta-
tionary state equilibrium in the case where the labour markets are completely integrated,
n = 1 (cf. also footnote 7). If labour cannot freely move between the sectors, then the use
of labour alongside land in the traditional sector does not change the results.
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spend money to increase the probability of getting their favorite type of gov-
ernment elected (cf. Johal and Ulph 2002). In the menu-auction model, it
is not possible for a lobbyist to spend money and effort on lobbying without
getting what he lobbied for. Because the menu-auction model characterizes
better the case in which the central planner’s decision variables (regulatory
constraints, subsidies) are continuous – so that the interest groups obtain
marginal improvements in their position by lobbying – it is chosen as a start-
ing point in this document.
In jurisdiction k ∈ [0, n], there is a policy maker (labeled k) which de-
termines relative union bargaining power, an employer lobby (labeled k) in
which oligopolists i ∈ Bk are organized, and a labour lobby (labeled k) in
which the workers of those oligopolists are organized. The lobbies influence
the policy maker by their political contributions. If economic integration
increases the size of the economy, but still leaves the regulation of the labour
markets at the local level, then the relative size 1
n
of a single jurisdiction falls.
It is assumed that labour is industry specific, for simplicity.2 There is one
unit of labour per industry. Of this, a fixed proportion ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is skilled
and the remainder 1−ϕ unskilled.3 It is assumed that the salaries for skilled
labour are competitively determined, again for simplicity. The equilibrium
condition for the market of skilled labour and the full-employment constraint
for unskilled labour in industry i are then given by
hi + zi = ϕ, li ≤ 1− ϕ, (2)
where ϕ (1−ϕ) is the supply of skilled (unskilled) labour, hi (zi) skilled labour
devoted to production (R&D) and li unskilled labour devoted to production
in that industry. Although skilled labour is fully employed, it is assumed
that unions and lobbies are common for both skilled and unskilled labour.
It will be shown that skilled labour can indirectly benefit from union power.
In this document, the common agency model (c.f. Bernheim and Whin-
ston 1986, Grossman and Helpman 1994, and Dixit et al. 1997) is used to
establish the political equilibrium (cf. Fig. 1). The players in that model
are households that consume, competitive firms that produce the final good,
2If labour moved freely between industries, then it would be extremely difficult to obtain
a stationary state equilibrium in a model where technological change is industry-specific.
3The transformation of unskilled into skilled labour is a dynamic process where
education plays a crucial role. The introduction of such dynamics into the model would
unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
5
  Regulator k € [0,n]
Oligopolist 
i € Bk
Labour union 
i € Bk
collective
bargaining
lobbying lobbyingregulation
The level of
jurisdiction k € [0,n]:
The level of 
industry i € B  :k
Figure 1: The political equilibrium in jurisdiction k ∈ [0, n].
oligopolists that make intermediate goods, labour unions, labour and em-
ployer lobbies, and policy makers. It is assumed that there is the following
sequence of decisions in the economy:
1. The employer and labour lobbies maximize the expected present value
of their members’ income flow by their offers to the policy maker of
their jurisdiction, relating their prospective political contributions to
the latter’s policy on relative union bargaining power.
2. The policy maker sets relative union bargaining power in its jurisdiction
to maximize the present value of the political contributions it receives
from the employer and labour lobbies.
3. The oligopolists and labour unions bargain over the wages for un-
skilled labour, maximizing the expected present value of the flow of
their profits and labour income, respectively.
4. The oligopolists employ unskilled labour for production and skilled
labour for R&D to maximize the expected present value of the flow
of their profits.
5. The salary for skilled labour is competitively determined.
6. The oligopolists employ skilled labour for production.
7. Competitive firms make the consumption good from the oligopolists’
outputs and the output of the traditional sector.
8. The households plan their consumption over time.
This game is solved in reverse order: stage 8 in section 3, stage 7 in section
4, stages 6, 5, 4 and 3 in section 5, and stages 2 and 1 in section 6.
6
3. Households
On the assumption that all households in the economy share the same
preferences, they can be represented by a single household that chooses its
flow of consumption c to maximize its utility starting at time T ,∫
∞
T
(log c)e−ρ(θ−T )dθ,
where θ is time, c consumption and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time preference.
This utility maximization leads to the Euler equation
X˙/X = r − ρ with X
.
= Pc, (3)
where P the consumption price index, X consumption expenditure, r the
interest rate and X˙
.
= dX/dθ. Because in the model there is no money that
would pin down the nominal price level at any time, one can normalize the
households’ total consumption expenditure X at unity. This and (3) yield
Pc = X = 1, P = 1/c, r = ρ = constant > 0. (4)
4. Final-goods producers
Because the supply of land is fixed, the output of the traditional sector,
µ, is a constant. The oligopolists i ∈ [0, 1] produce high-tech goods. These
are substitutes and form the composite product
ψ = Ψ
.
=
(∫ 1
0
Aiy
1−1/ǫ
i di
)ǫ/(ǫ−1)
,
ǫ > 1, (5)
where yi is the output of oligopolist i, ǫ the constant elasticity of product
substitution and Ai the productivity of good i in providing services to the
households. Oligopolist i can increase its productivity Ai by investing in
R&D. The composite high-tech good ψ and the traditional good µ are sub-
stitutes: the consumption good is produced according to CES technology
c = Φ(ψ, µ)
.
=
[
νψ1−1/δ + (1− ν)µ1−1/δ
]δ/(δ−1)
,
0 < ν < 1, δ > 1, (6)
where ν is a parameter and δ the constant elasticity of substitution.
Because all final-good producers are competitive, they can be represented
by a single firm that maximizes its profit Pc −
∫ 1
0
piyidi by its inputs yi,
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i ∈ [0, 1], subject to technology (5) and (6), given the output price P and the
input prices pi, i ∈ [0, 1]. Because the rent for land is equal to the marginal
product for land, ∂Φ/∂µ, the expenditure share of rents is given by
µ
Φ
∂Φ
∂µ
∈ (0, 1). (7)
It is plausible to assume that the expenditure share of rents, (7), is smaller
than (1−1/ǫ)/(1−1/δ).4 Given this and (4), the profit maximization yields
the inverse demand curve of oligopolist i as follows (cf. A):
pi = b(ψ)Aiy
−1/ǫ
i with
1
ǫ
− 1 <
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
< 0 and lim
ν→1
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
=
1
ǫ
− 1. (8)
5. High-tech industries
Because the number of industries i ∈ [0, 1] is large, oligopolist i and union
i take the interest rate r and the quantity of the composite high-tech good, ψ,
as given [cf. (5)]. Oligopolist i (union i) pays political contributions Rio (R
i
u)
to the policy maker of its jurisdiction. Because Rio and R
i
u are determined
by lobbying at the level of the jurisdiction, they are given for oligopolist i
and union i as well.
5.1. Technological change
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998),
technological change is specified as follows. Oligopolist i invests in R&D to
improve its technology. During a short time interval dθ, it has an innovation
dqi = 1 with probability Λidθ, and no innovation dqi = 0 with probability
1 − Λidθ. It is assumed that the arrival rate of innovations, Λi, is in fixed
proportion λ to skilled labour devoted to R&D, zi:
Λi = λzi, λ > 0, zi ≥ 0. (9)
4This condition is satisfied already when the elasticity of substitution between two
high-tech products, ǫ, is higher than that between the composite high-tech good and the
traditional good, δ. In modern economies, the GNP share of agriculture, which approxi-
mates (7), is less than 20%. Given this, the condition holds true also when either ǫ > 5
4
or δ < (5/ǫ− 4)−1
.
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The serial number of technology for oligopolist i is denoted by ti and pro-
ductivity corresponding to that technology by Ai(ti). It is assumed that an
invention of a new technology raises ti by one and Ai(ti) by constant a > 1:
Ai(ti + 1) = aAi(ti), a > 1. (10)
Because technology changes from ti to ti + 1 with probability Λidθ, and
does not change with probability 1−Λidθ during interval dθ, then, given (9)
and (10), the expected average growth rate of productivity Ai(ti) is in fixed
proportion (log a)λ to labour devoted to R&D, zi:
gi
.
= ΛiE[logAi(ti + 1)− logAi(ti)] = (log a)Λi = (log a)λzi, (11)
where E is the expectation operator. The level of productivity Ai(ti) has the
expected present value (cf. B, or Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 61)
E
∫
∞
T
Ai(ti)e
−r(θ−T )dθ =
AiT
r + (1− a)Λi
=
AiT
r + (1− a)λzi
, (12)
where AiT is productivity at time T .
5.2. Production and profits
Oligopolist i produces its output yi from unskilled labour li and skilled
labour hi according to the CES function
yi = F (li, hi), Fl
.
=
∂F
∂li
> 0, Fh
.
=
∂F
∂hi
> 0, Fll
.
=
∂2F
∂li
2 < 0,
Fhh
.
=
∂2F
∂h2i
< 0, Fl h
.
=
∂2F
∂li∂hi
> 0,
FlFh
Fl hF
= γ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), (13)
where γ is the constant elasticity of factor substitution. It pays the wage
Wi for its unskilled labour li and the salary Si for its skilled labour hi + zi,
of which hi is devoted to production and zi to R&D. Its profits are equal
to sales revenue piyi minus wages Wili, salaries Si(hi + zi), and its political
contributions Rio. Noting the inverse demand curve (8) and the production
function (13), the profit of oligopolist i can then be written as follows:
Πi
.
= piyi −Wili − Si(hi + zi)− R
i
o = bAiy
1−1/ǫ
i −Wili − Si(hi + zi)− R
i
o
= b(ψ)AiF (li, hi)
1−1/ǫ −Wili − Si(hi + zi)− R
i
o. (14)
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5.3. Skilled labour
The oligopolist maximizes its profits by skilled labour devoted to pro-
duction, hi, given the wage for skilled labour, Si, unskilled labour devoted
to production, li, skilled labour devoted to R&D, zi, productivity Ai and
the quantity of the composite product, ψ.5 The first-order condition of this
maximization, ∂Πi/∂hi = 0, leads to the inverse demand function of skilled
labour [cf. (13)] as follows:
Si =
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fh(li, hi)
F (li, hi)1/ǫ
b(ψ)Ai. (15)
The salary Si adjusts to balance the market for skilled labour, hi+zi = ϕ
[cf. (2)]. Given this, (13) and (15), the equilibrium salary becomes a function
of unskilled labour li, input to R&D, zi, and the level of demand b(ψ)Ai:
Si = s(li, zi, γ, ǫ)b(ψ)Ai, s(li, zi, γ, ǫ)
.
=
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fh(li, ϕ− zi)
F (li, ϕ− zi)1/ǫ
,
∂s
∂li
=
(
Flh
Fh
−
Fl
ǫF
)
s =
(
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
ǫF
s︸︷︷︸
+
> 0 ⇔
1
γ
>
1
ǫ
⇔ ǫ > γ,
∂s
∂zi
=
(
Fh
ǫF︸︷︷︸
+
−
Fhh
Fh︸︷︷︸
−
)
s > 0. (16)
Results (16) can be interpreted as follows:
• When more skilled labour zi is devoted to R&D, the demand for skilled
labour increases. This raises the productivity-adjusted salary s =
Si/[b(ψ)Ai] for skilled labour, ∂s/∂zi > 0.
• The higher the price elasticity of demand for an oligopolist, ǫ, the
stronger the output effect : an increase of unskilled labour in production
raises both output and the input of skilled labour to production. The
higher the elasticity of factor substitution, γ, the stronger the substi-
tution effect : an increase of unskilled labour in production substitutes
for skilled labour in production at the given level of output yi. If the
5The oligopolist employs skilled labour hi for production at stage 6, while the wage for
skilled labour, Si, unskilled labour devoted to production, li, and skilled labour devoted
to R&D, zi, are determined at earlier stages (cf. subsection 2).
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elasticity of product substitution, ǫ, is greater than that of factor substi-
tution, γ, then the output effect dominates over the substitution effect.
In that case, an increase of unskilled labour in production raises the
demand for skilled labour, increasing the productivity-adjusted salary
s for skilled labour, ∂s/∂li > 0.
5.4. Output and the employment of unskilled labour
To obtain a stationary-state equilibrium where labour inputs (li, zi) are
constant for all serial numbers ti of technology over time, it is assumed that
oligopolist i and labour union i bargain over the productivity-adjusted wage
wi
.
=Wi/[b(ψ)Ai], (17)
where Ai and b(ψ) are the levels of productivity due to past investment in
R&D and the composite product ψ, correspondingly. Thus, oligopolist i takes
wi as given in its production plans. Noting (2), (16) and (17), the profit of
oligopolist i, (14), becomes
Πi = πiAib(ψ)− R
i
o with
πi = π(li, zi, wi, γ, ǫ)
.
= F (li, hi)
1−1/ǫ − wili − s(li, zi, γ, ǫ)(hi + zi)
= F (li, ϕ− zi)
1−1/ǫ − wili − ϕs(li, zi, γ, ǫ). (18)
Because the system has a stationary state solution where inputs (li, zi)
are constants, the optimum can be solved by choosing (li, zi) from the class of
constant controls.6 Oligopolist i maximizes the expected discounted value of
the flow of its profits (18) starting at time θ = T , E
∫
∞
T
Πie
−r(θ−T )dθ, by in-
puts (li, zi), subject to the full-employment constraints (2) and technological
change (cf. subsection 5.1), given the composite product ψ, the productivity-
adjusted wage wi and political contributions R
i
o. In the stationary-state equi-
librium, the productivity-adjusted profit (net of political contributions Rio),
πi, is constant for all serial numbers ti of technology [cf. (18)]. Given this,
(12) and (18), the utility of oligopolist i is
E
∫
∞
T
Πie
−r(θ−T )dθ = b(ψ)πiE
∫
∞
T
Ai(ti)e
−r(θ−T )dθ − Rio
∫
∞
T
e−r(θ−T )dθ
6The use of stochastic dynamic programming (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994) leads to the
same results. Detailed calculations of this will be provided to the reader on request.
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=
πib(ψ)AiT
r + (1− a)λzi
−
Rio
r
= b(ψ)AiT
π(li, zi, wi, γ, ǫ)
r + (1− a)λzi
−
Rio
r
. (19)
Maximizing (19) by (li, zi) and noting (18), one obtains the value function
of oligopolist i as follows:
P
(
wi, c, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
o
) .
= max
li,hi,zi
E
∫
∞
T
Πie
−r(θ−T )dθ
= b(ψ)AiT
π(l∗i , z
∗
i , wi, γ, ǫ)
r + (1− a)λz∗i
−
Rio
r
with
∂P
∂wi
= −
lib(ψ)AiT
r + (1− a)λzi
< 0,
(20)
where the oligopolist’s optimal inputs (l∗i , z
∗
i ) are taken as given. Maximizing
(19) by (li, zi) leads also to the oligopolist’s response functions (cf. C):
li = l˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ), zi = z˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ), z˜w
.
=
∂z˜
∂wi
> 0 ⇔ ǫ > γ,
l˜w
.
=
∂l˜
∂wi
< 0, yi = y˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)
.
= F (l˜, h˜), y˜w
.
=
∂y˜
∂wi
< 0 for ǫ > γ.
(21)
The results (21) can be interpreted as follows:
• An increase of the productivity-adjusted wage wi for unskilled labour
decreases the demand for unskilled labour, l˜w < 0.
• The higher the price elasticity of demand for an oligopolist, ǫ, the
stronger the output effect : an increase in the productivity-adjusted
wage wi for unskilled labour lowers both output and the demand for
skilled labour in production, h˜. The higher the elasticity of factor sub-
stitution, γ, the stronger the substitution effect : an increase in the
productivity-adjusted wage wi for unskilled labour raises the demand
for skilled labour in production, h˜. If the elasticity of product sub-
stitution, ǫ, is greater than that of factor substitution, γ, then the
output effect dominates over the substitution effect and an increase in
the productivity-adjusted wage wi lowers the demand for skilled labour
in production. Because skilled labour is fully employed, this generates
a transfer of skilled labour from production to R&D, z˜w > 0.
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5.5. Labour union i
The members of union i (= the workers of oligopolist i) earn wages Wili
plus salaries Si(hi + zi) minus their political contributions R
i
u. Noting (2),
(16), (17) and (21), one obtains the members’ income as follows:
Vi
.
=Wili + Si(hi + zi)− R
i
u = [wili + si(hi + zi)]Aib(ψ)− R
i
u
=
[
wili + ϕs
(
li, zi, γ, ǫ
)]
Aib(ψ)−R
i
u = v(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)Aib(ψ)− R
i
u with
v(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)
.
= wil˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ) + ϕs
(
l˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ), z˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ), γ, ǫ
)
. (22)
Union i observes technological change (cf. subsection 5.1). Because inputs
(l˜, z˜) and the productivity-adjusted wage wi are constants in equilibrium,
then, given (12), (21) and (22), the expected present value of the flow of the
union members’ income (22) at time θ = T is
W
(
wi, c, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
u
) .
= E
∫
∞
T
Vie
−r(θ−T )dθ
= b(ψ)v(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)E
∫
∞
T
Ai(ti)e
−r(θ−T )dθ −
Riu
r
= b(ψ)AiT
v(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)
r + (1− a)λz˜
−
Riu
r
. (23)
5.6. Collective bargaining
Oligopolist i attempts to maximize its value function (20) and labour
union i its value function (23) by the productivity-adjusted wage wi in an
alternating-offers game, given the quantity of the composite high-tech good,
ψ, the interest rate r and political contributions (Riu, R
i
o). Both of them can
also forestall production alone. Because oligopolist i (union i) earns nothing
but pays its political contributions Rio (R
i
u) in the case of no production, its
fall-back income is the discounted value of the flow of these contributions
−Rio/r (−R
i
u/r). The outcome of the alternating-offers game is obtained
by maximizing the Generalized Nash Product (GNP) of the utilities of the
parties, (20) and (23),
Θ(wi, c, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
u)
.
= αi log
[
W
(
wi, c, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
u
)
− (−Riu/r)
]
+ (1− αi) log
[
P
(
wi, c, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
u
)
− (−Rio/r)
]
= logAiT + (1/ǫ− 1)b(ψ) + αi
{
log v(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)− log[r + (1− a)λz˜]
}
+ (1− αi)
{
log π(l∗i , z
∗
i , wi, γ, ǫ)− log[r + (1− a)λz
∗
i ]
}
(24)
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by the productivity-adjusted wage wi, where αi ∈ [0, 1] is the relative bar-
gaining power of union i. On the assumption that the equilibrium is unique,
this maximization implies that the productivity-adjusted wage wi is an in-
creasing function of relative union bargaining power αi (cf. D):
wi = w(αi, γ, ǫ, λ), ∂wi/∂αi > 0. (25)
In this document, the skilled and unskilled workers are assumed to belong
to the same labour union, for simplicity. In E, it is shown that skilled worker
can have economic incentives to stay as a union member, although his/her
salary is competitively determined.
6. Lobbies and policy makers
Employer lobby k represents the oligopolists i ∈ Bk and labour lobby k
the workers of these in jurisdiction k. It is assumed that relative union bar-
gaining power αi and political contributions (R
i
ku, R
i
ko) are uniform through-
out the industries i ∈ Bk of the same jurisdiction k:
αi = βk, R
i
u = Rku and R
i
o = Rko for i ∈ Bk. (26)
Given (21) and (25), this unifies the productivity-adjusted wages throughout
that jurisdiction
wi = ̟k for i ∈ Bk. (27)
Define the average productivity in jurisdiction k by [cf. (1)]
A˜k
.
=
∫
i∈Bk
AiTdi
/∫
i∈Bk
di = n
∫
i∈Bk
AiTdi, (28)
the average productivity in the other jurisdictions ζ 6= k by the vector
A˜−k
.
= {A˜ζ | ζ 6= k}, (29)
and the productivity-adjusted wages ̟ζ in jurisdictions ζ 6= k by the vector
̟−k
.
= {̟ζ| ζ 6= k}. (30)
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Given (5), (21), (27), (28), (29) and (30), the composite product ψ is de-
termined by the productivity-adjusted wages (̟k, ̟−k) and the levels of
productivity, (A˜k, A˜−k), as follows (cf. F):
ψ = ψ˜(̟k, ̟−k, A˜k, A˜−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ), ψ˜̟k
.
=
∂ψ
∂̟k
,
ψ˜̟k
ψ˜
∣∣∣∣
̟ζ = ̟ and A˜ζ = A for all ζ
=
1
n
y˜w
y˜
. (31)
The utility functions of employer lobby k and labour lobby k, Fk and Uk,
are obtained by plugging productivity-adjusted wages (27) and the composite
high-tech good (31) into the utility functions of oligopolist i and labour union
i, (20) and (23):
Fk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ, Rko) = P
(
̟k, ψ˜, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
o
)
, (32)
Uk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ, Rku) =W
(
̟k, ψ˜, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
o
)
. (33)
The contribution schedule of the labour (employer) lobby Rku (Rko) depends
on the arguments (̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ) of its utility function (32) ((33)):
Rku(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ), Rko(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ). (34)
Policy maker k collects the flow of the political contributions Rko+Rku from
all oligopolists and labour unions in jurisdiction k ∈ [0, n],
∫
i∈Bk
(Riko+R
i
ku)di.
It maximizes the present value of this flow of income [cf. (1), (27) and (34)]:
Gk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
.
= E
∫
∞
T
[∫
i∈Bk
(Riko +R
i
ku)di
]
e−r(θ−T )dθ
=
Rko +Rku
rn
=
1
rn
[
Rko(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ) +Rku(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
]
.
(35)
7. Political Equilibrium
Plugging the functions (21) and the conditions (27) into the sector-specific
full-employment constraints (2) yields the full-employment constraint for ju-
risdiction k:
l˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ) ≤ 1− ϕ. (36)
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Employer lobby k and labour lobby k influence policy maker k over union bar-
gaining power βk. These three agents take the productivity-adjusted wages
elsewhere, ̟−k, as given and observe the full-employment constraint (36).
Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from βk to ̟k through (25),
(26) and (27), it is equivalent to assume that the lobbies influence policy
maker k over the productivity-adjusted wage ̟k subject to (36), given ̟−k.
In each jurisdiction k, there is a common agency game that yields the
following equilibrium conditions (cf. G). First, the policy maker has no
incentives to depart from the policy ̟k, i.e. the policy ̟k maximizes its
welfare (35):
̟k = arg max
̟k s.t. (36)
Gk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ). (37)
Second, the lobbies have no incentives to depart from the policy ̟k, i.e. the
employer (labour) lobby cannot have a feasible strategy Rko (Rku) that yields
it higher utility (32) ((33)) than in equilibrium, given the policy maker’s
expected policy:
̟k = arg max
̟k s.t. (36)
Fk
(
̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, Rko(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
)
,
̟k = arg max
̟k s.t. (36)
Uk
(
̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, Rku(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
)
. (38)
Considering the economy in the vicinity of the point where average pro-
ductivity A˜k is initially the same for all jurisdictions k ∈ [0, n], and noting
(21), (31), (32), (33), (35) and (38), one can transform the policy maker’s
equilibrium conditions (37) into the following form (cf. H):
l˜ < 1− ϕ ⇔ ∆ = 0 with
∂∆
∂̟k
< 0, l˜ = 1− ϕ ⇔ ∆ < 0, (39)
where ∆
.
=
[
1−
1
ǫ
+
b′(ψ˜)
b(ψ˜)
ψ˜
n
]
y˜w
y˜︸︷︷︸
−
+
(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
a− 1)λz˜w
r + (1− a)λz˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
. (40)
The result (39) and (40) can be explained as follows. The term
(a− 1)λz˜w
r + (1− a)λz˜
(41)
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characterizes the growth effect of the productivity-adjusted wage ̟k. If the
output effect dominates over the substitution effect, ǫ > γ, then the growth
effect (41) is positive [cf. (21)]. If vice versa ǫ < γ, then (41) is negative.
If the productivity-adjusted wage ̟k in jurisdiction k increases, then the
sales revenue piyi of any industry i ∈ Bk falls [cf. (8), (21) and (31)]:
7
1
piyi
∂(piyi)
∂̟k
=
∂ log(piyi)
∂̟k
=
∂ log[b(ψ)y˜1−1/ǫ]
∂̟k
=
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
y˜w
y˜
+
b′
b
ψ˜w
ψ˜
=
[
1−
1
ǫ
+
b′(ψ˜)
b(ψ˜)
ψ˜
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
y˜w
y˜︸︷︷︸
−
< 0. (42)
If this level effect dominates over the growth effect (41), i.e. ∆ < 0, then
the productivity-adjusted wage ̟k is decreased, until the full-employment
l˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ) = 1 − ϕ is attained [cf. (36)], and the political process ends
up with labour market deregulation. Otherwise, an increase in ̟k raises the
welfare of some lobby, which creates incentives for labour market regulation.
Because, by (8) and (42),
∂
∂( 1
n
)
[
1
piyi
∂(piyi)
∂̟k
]
=
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
y˜w
y˜︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
the fall in the sales revenue, (42), is the steeper, the more the industries
i ∈ Bk face competition from the industries i /∈ Bk outside the jurisdiction
k, i.e. the smaller the relative proportion 1
n
of that jurisdiction k.
8. Labour market integration
Without R&D, λ→ 0 [cf. (9)], there is no growth effect (41) and ∆ < 0
[cf. (40)]. From (39) it then follows that l˜ = 1− ϕ. In other words:
Proposition 1. The existence of R&D (i.e. λ > 0) enables an equilibrium
with labour market regulation and unemployment l˜ < 1− ϕ.
7From (8) it follows that that if there is no traditional sector, ν → 1 [cf. (6)], then
there is no level effect (42) and no equilibrium with full labour market integration, n = 1.
That is why the traditional sector is introduced into the model.
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Without R&D, all skilled labour is devoted to production. In that case, both
lobbies attain their highest level of welfare in the presence of full employment,
having no incentives to lobby for labour market regulation.
If ǫ ≤ γ, then, from (21), (39) and (40), it follows that z˜w ≤ 0, ∆ < 0
and l˜ = 1− ϕ. Thus, l˜ < 1− ϕ is possible only if ǫ > γ. In other words:
Proposition 2. Labour market regulation l˜ < 1− ϕ is possible only if the
elasticity of product substitution, ǫ, exceeds that of factor substitution, γ.
If the output effect dominates over the substitution effect, ǫ > γ, then the
growth effect is positive and can outweigh the negative level effect. Other-
wise, a decrease in the productivity-adjusted wage ̟k benefits the lobbies
and the political process ends up with labour market deregulation.
From (8) and (40) it follows that
∂∆
∂( 1
n
)
=
ψ˜b′(ψ˜)
b(ψ˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
y˜w
y˜︸︷︷︸
−
> 0. (43)
Given (39), this implies ∆ < 0 and l˜ = 1− ϕ for low values of 1
n
, and ∆ = 0
and l˜ < 1− ϕ for high values of 1
n
. In other worlds:
Proposition 3. Assume that there exists a positive growth effect, ǫ > γ.
In that case, the labour markets are deregulated (l = 1 − ϕ) for small, and
regulated (l < 1− ϕ) for high relative proportions 1
n
of a single jurisdiction.
If competition from outside the jurisdiction is weak (i.e. if 1
n
is close to one),
then the growth effect (41) outweighs the level effect (42) and lobbying leads
to labour market regulation. Otherwise, the labour markets are deregulated.
Differentiating the first-order condition ∆ = 0 [cf. (39)] and noting (39)
and (43), one obtains
d̟k
d( 1
n
)
= −
∂∆
∂( 1
n
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
/
∂∆
∂̟︸︷︷︸
−
> 0. (44)
From (11), (21) and (27) it then follows that
∂gi
∂̟k
=
∂gi
∂wi
= (log a)λ
∂z˜
∂wi
> 0 ⇔
∂z˜
∂wi
> 0 ⇔ ǫ > γ. (45)
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According to Proposition 2, inequality ǫ > γ holds true for l < 1− ϕ. From
this, (44) and (45) it follows that when l < 1− ϕ, both ̟k (for all k) and gi
(for all i) increase with an increase in 1
n
. In other wods:
Proposition 4. If the labour markets are initially regulated, l < 1−ϕ, then
an increase in the size of jurisdictions, 1
n
, raises both the productivity-adjusted
wages (̟k for all k) and the productivity growth rates (gi for all i).
If the labour markets are initially regulated, then the growth effect is pos-
itive. The expansion of jurisdictions weakens the negative level effect, for
there will be less competition from outside the jurisdiction. This strengthens
the incentives to lobby for labour market regulation, promoting R&D and
productivity growth.
9. Conclusions
In the economy under consideration, oligopolists employ unskilled and
skilled labour, produce high-tech goods and perform research and develop-
ment (R&D) to escape labour costs. Labour is unionized, but skilled labour
is fully employed. There are many jurisdictions, each of them having a self-
interested policy maker that can regulate (deregulate) the labour markets by
supporting labour unions (employers). The workers’ and employers’ interest
groups lobby the policy makers. The main results are the following.
Labour market regulation raises the wages for unskilled labour. This
affects productivity growth through two channels. On the one hand, the
oligopolists increase their output price and decrease their output (the output
effect). With a lower level of output, there are less skilled labour in produc-
tion. On the other hand, the oligopolists replace unskilled by skilled labour
at the given level of output (the substitution effect). The higher the elasticity
of substitution between goods, the higher the price elasticity of demand for
an oligopolist and the stronger the output effect. The higher the elasticity
of factor substitution, the stronger the substitution effect. If the elasticity
of product substitution is higher than that of factor substitution, then the
output effect dominates over the substitution effect: labour market regula-
tion decreases skilled labour devoted to production. Because skilled labour
is fully employed, more skilled labour is devoted to productivity-enhancing
R&D. If this positive growth effect outweighs the negative effect of wage
increases on income, then there are incentives to lobby for labour market
regulation. Otherwise, the labour markets are deregulated.
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If jurisdictions expand, they face less competition from elsewhere in the
economy. This weakens the fall of income due to wage increases, strength-
ening the incentives to lobby for labour market regulation. If the labour
markets are well integrated (i.e. if jurisdictions are large), then the growth
effect outweighs the competition effect and there is labour market regulation.
On the other hand, if the labour markets are incompletely integrated (i.e. if
jurisdictions are small), then they are deregulated. In the presence of labour
market regulation, the integration of the labour markets (i.e. the increase of
the size of jurisdictions) strengthens the growth effect even further, increasing
wages and speeding up productivity growth.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
model is used to explain the relationship of productivity growth, collective
bargaining and lobbying, the following judgement nevertheless seems to be
justified. The observed tendency to labour market deregulation (Acemoglu et
al. 2001, Dumont et al. 2012) can result from labour market policy being left
at the local level. Once labour market policy is established and the workers’
and employers’ interest groups are organized at the level of the otherwise
integrated economy, labour market regulation can reappear.
A. Equation (8)
From (5) it follows that Ψ1−1/ǫ =
∫ 1
0
Aζy
1−1/ǫ
ζ dζ. Differentiating this with
respect to yi and noting (5) yield
∂Ψ
∂yi
= Aiy
−1/ǫ
i Ψ
1/ǫ = Aiy
−1/ǫ
i ψ
1/ǫ. (46)
Maximizing the profit Pc−
∫ 1
0
piyidi by yi subject to (5) and (6), noting (4)
and (46), and holding P and pi for i ∈ [0, 1] constant, one obtains
pi = P
∂Φ
∂ψ
∂Ψ
∂yi
=
1
c
∂Φ
∂ψ
Aiy
−1/ǫ
i ψ
1/ǫ =
1
Φ
∂Φ
∂ψ
Aiy
−1/ǫ
i ψ
1/ǫ = b(ψ)Aiy
−1/ǫ
i
with b(ψ)
.
= ν(Φ/ψ)1/δ−1ψ1/ǫ−1 and
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
=
(
1
δ
− 1
)(
ψ
Φ
∂Φ
∂ψ
− 1
)
+
1
ǫ
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
=
(
1−
1
δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
µ
Φ
∂Φ
∂µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
1
ǫ
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
>
1
ǫ
− 1.
From this and (6) it is easy to see that
lim
ν→1
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
= lim
Φ→ψ
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
= lim
ψ
Φ
∂Φ
∂ψ
→1
ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
=
1
ǫ
− 1,
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ψb′(ψ)
b(ψ)
< 0 for the assumption
µ
Φ
∂Φ
∂µ
<
(
1−
1
ǫ
)/(
1−
1
δ
)
.
B. Function (12)
Define the expected value
Ω(ti) = E
∫
∞
T
Ai(ti)e
−r(θ−T )dθ. (47)
Given technological change (cf. subsection 5.1), the Bellman equation is (cf.
Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
rΩ(ti) = Ai(ti) + Λi
[
Ω(ti + 1)− Ω(ti)
]
, (48)
where rΩ(ti) is the revenue from assets Ω(ti) at the market interest rate r,
Ai(ti) current income from assets Ω(ti) and Λi
[
Ω(ti+1)−Ω(ti)
]
the expected
increase of the value of assets Ω(ti). Let us try the solution
Ω(ti) = Ai(ti)/ω, (49)
in which the discount factor ω > 0 is independent of ti. Inserting (49) into
the Bellman equation (48) yields
r =
Ai(ti)
Ω(ti)
+ Λi
[
Ω(ti + 1)
Ω(ti)
− 1
]
= ω + (a− 1)Λi. (50)
Solving for ω from (50), inserting this into (49), and noting (47), one obtains
E
∫
∞
T
Ai(ti)e
−r(θ−T )dθ = Ω(ti) =
AiT
r + (1− a)Λi
,
where AiT is productivity at time T .
C. Functions (21)
Noting (18) and (19), its holds true that
(li, zi) = argmax
li,zi
E
∫
∞
T
Πie
−r(θ−T )dθ = argmax
li,zi
πi
r + (1− a)λzi
= argmax
li,zi
{
log πi − log[r + (1− a)λzi]
}
= argmax
li,zi
Ξ(li, zi, wi, γ, ǫ, λ)
with Ξ(li, zi, wi, γ, ǫ, λ)
.
= log π(li, zi, wi, γ, ǫ)− log[r + (1− a)λzi].
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Given (18), this leads to the first-order conditions
∂Ξ
∂li
=
1
π
∂π
∂li
= 0,
∂Ξ
∂zi
=
1
π
∂π
∂zi
+
(a− 1)λ
r + (1− a)λzi
= 0. (51)
From (16) and (18) it follows that
∂π
∂li
=
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
F 1/ǫ
− ϕ
∂s
∂li
− wi =
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
F 1/ǫ
−
(
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
)
ϕFl
ǫF
s− wi
=
(
1−
1
ǫ
)[
Fl
F 1/ǫ
−
(
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
)
ϕFl
ǫF
Fh
F 1/ǫ
]
− wi
=
(
1−
1
ǫ
)[
1−
(
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
)
ϕFh(li, ϕ− zi)
ǫF (li, ϕ− zi)
]
Fl(li, ϕ− zi)
F (li, ϕ− zi)1/ǫ
− wi = 0.
(52)
Given this and (13), one obtains[
1−
(
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
)
ϕFh
ǫF
]
−1
=
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
F 1/ǫ
1
wi
and
∂2π
∂li∂zi
= −wi
{[
1−
(
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
)
ϕFh
ǫF
]
−1(
1
ǫ
−
1
γ
)
ϕFh
ǫF
(
Fhh
Fh
−
F 2h
ǫF
)
+
Flh
Fl
−
Fh
ǫF
}
= −wi
{(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
F 1/ǫ
1
wi
(
1
ǫ
−
1
γ
)
ϕFh
ǫF
(
Fhh
Fh
−
F 2h
ǫF
)
+
Fh
γF
−
Fh
ǫF
}
= −wi
Fh
F
{(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
F 1/ǫ
1
wi
(
1
ǫ
−
1
γ
)
ϕ
ǫ
(
Fhh
Fh
−
F 2h
ǫF
)
+
1
γ
−
1
ǫ
}
=
(
1
ǫ
−
1
γ
)
wi
Fh
F︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
{
1 +
(
1−
1
ǫ
)
Fl
F 1/ǫ
1
wi
ϕ
ǫ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
F 2h
ǫF︸︷︷︸
+
−
Fhh
Fh︸︷︷︸
−
)}
< 0
⇔ ǫ > γ. (53)
If the oligopolist’s equilibrium is unique, the function π must be strictly
concave. This implies
∂2Ξ
∂zi2
< 0, J
.
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂
2Ξ
∂li
2
∂2Ξ
∂li∂zi
∂2Ξ
∂li∂zi
∂2Ξ
∂zi2
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0. (54)
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Differentiating the equations (51) totally yields[
∂2Ξ
∂li
2
∂2Ξ
∂li∂zi
∂2Ξ
∂li∂zi
∂2Ξ
∂zi2
] [
dli
dhi
]
+
[
−1
0
]
dwi = 0.
Noting (51), (53) and (54), one obtains the functions
li = l˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ), zi = z˜(wi, γ, ǫ, λ),
∂l˜
∂wi
=
1
J
∂2Ξ
∂zi2
< 0,
∂z˜
∂wi
= −
1
J
∂2Ξ
∂li∂zi
= −
1
J
1
π
∂2π
∂li∂zi
> 0 ⇔
∂2π
∂li∂zi
< 0 ⇔ ǫ > γ. (55)
D. Results (25)
It is equivalent to choose wi to maximize
Θ/αi = [logAiT + (1/ǫ− 1) log c]/αi + log v(wi, γ, ǫ, λ)− log[r + (1− a)λz˜]
+ (1/αi − 1)
{
log π(l∗i , z
∗
i , wi, γ, ǫ)− log[r + (1− a)λz
∗
i ]
}
,
where (l∗i , z
∗
i ) must be taken as constants. Noting (18) and (21), one obtains
the first-order condition for this maximization as follows:
1
αi
∂Θ
∂wi
=
1
v
∂v
∂wi
+
(a− 1)λz˜w
r + (1− a)λz˜
+
(
1
αi
− 1
)
1
π
∂π
∂wi
=
1
v
∂v
∂wi
+
(a− 1)λz˜w
r + (1− a)λz˜
−
(
1
αi
− 1
)
li
π
= 0.
From this it follows that
∂
∂αi
(
1
αi
∂Θ
∂wi
)
=
1
α2i
li
π
> 0. (56)
On the assumption that the equilibrium is unique, the second-order condition
1
αi
∂2Θ
∂wi2
< 0
holds true. Noting this and (56), one obtains
wi = w(αi, γ, ǫ, λ),
∂wi
∂αi
= −
∂
∂α
(
1
αi
∂Θ
∂wi
)/(
1
α
∂2Θ
∂w2i
)
> 0.
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E. A skilled worker’s incentives to belong to the union
Because skilled labour in fully employed, the expected present value of
the flow of salaries for a skilled worker is given by [cf. (12) and (16)]
E
∫
∞
T
Sie
−r(θ−T )dθ = b(ψ)s(li, zi, γ, ǫ)E
∫
∞
T
Ai(ti)e
−r(θ−T )dθ
= b(ψ)AiT
s(li, zi, γ, ǫ)
r + (1− a)λz˜
. (57)
The effect of relative union bargaining power αi on a skilled worker’s welfare
(57) can be calculated by (16), (21) and (25) as follows:
∂
∂αi
logE
∫
∞
T
Sie
−r(θ−T )dθ
=
{
1
si︸︷︷︸
+
∂s
∂li︸︷︷︸
+
∂l˜
∂wi︸︷︷︸
−
+
[
1
si︸︷︷︸
+
∂s
∂zi︸︷︷︸
+
+
(a− 1)λ
r + (1− a)λz˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
∂z˜
∂wi︸︷︷︸
+
}
∂w
∂αi︸︷︷︸
+
for ǫ > γ.
If the output effect dominates over the substitution effect, ǫ > γ, then an
increase of the productivity-adjusted wage wi for unskilled labour has two
opposite effects on a skilled worker’s welfare:
• It increases the demand for skilled labour in R&D, raising both the
level and the expected growth of the salary Si.
• It decreases the demand for unskilled labour in production, lowering
the salary Si.
If the former effect dominates over the latter, then an increase in relative
union bargaining power αi benefits a skilled worker. This shows that a skilled
worker can have incentives to belong to the same labour union together with
unskilled workers, although his/her salary is competitively determined.
F. Function (31)
Noting (1), (5), (21), (28) and (27), total consumption is determined as:
ψ = ψ˜(̟k, ̟−k, A˜k, A˜−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
.
=
[∫ n
0
(∫
i∈Bk
Aiy
1−1/ǫ
i di
)
dk
]ǫ/(ǫ−1)
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=[∫ n
0
(
y˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
1−1/ǫ
∫
i∈Bk
Aidi
)
dk
]ǫ/(ǫ−1)
=
[∫ n
0
y˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
1−1/ǫ A˜k
n
dk
]ǫ/(ǫ−1)
,
ψ˜̟k
.
=
∂ψ˜
∂̟k
.
This implies
ψ̟k
ψ
=
∂ log ψ˜
∂̟k
=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
∂
∂̟k
log
∫ n
0
y˜(̟ζ, γ, ǫ, λ)
1−1/ǫA˜ζdζ
=
y˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
−1/ǫA˜k∫ n
0
y˜(̟ζ, γ, ǫ, λ)1−1/ǫA˜ζdζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
y˜w(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0 with
ψ˜̟k
ψ˜
∣∣∣∣
̟ζ = ̟ and A˜ζ = A for all ζ
=
1
n
y˜w
y˜
< 0.
G. Equilibrium conditions (37) and (38)
According to proposition 1 of Dixit et al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for the game between the employer lobby, the labour lobby and
the policy maker in jurisdiction k is a set of contribution schedules (34) and
a policy ̟k s.t. the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) The contributions of the union and employer lobbies, Rku and Rko, are
non-negative but no more than the contributor’s income. This is evi-
dent in the model.
(ii) The policy ̟k maximizes the policy maker’s welfare (35):
̟k = arg max
̟k s.t. (36)
Gk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ).
(iii) The employer (labour) lobby cannot have a feasible strategy
Rko(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
(
Rku(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
)
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that yields it higher utility (32) ((33)) than in equilibrium, given the
policy maker’s expected policy:
̟k = arg max
̟k s.t. (36)
Fk
(
̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, Rko(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
)
,
̟k = arg max
̟k s.t. (36)
Uk
(
̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, Rku(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
)
.
(iv) The employer (labour) lobby provides the policy maker at least with the
level of utility than in the case where the lobby offers nothing Rko = 0
(Rku = 0), and where the policy maker responds optimally given the
other lobby’s contribution function (33) ((32)). This is assumed to hold
true in the model, because otherwise there is no lobbying.
H. Results (39) and (40)
Because the equilibrium conditions (37) and (38) are symmetric through-
out the jurisdictions k ∈ [0, n], the productivity adjusted wages will be uni-
form, ̟k = ̟ for k ∈ [0, 1], in general equilibrium. Thus, the properties
of the partial equilibrium of a single jurisdiction k can be examined in the
vicinity of general equilibrium ̟ζ = ̟ for ζ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition to this,
calculations are carried out in the vicinity of the point where average pro-
ductivity A˜k is initially the same for all jurisdictions k ∈ [0, n], for simplicity.
Noting (18), (20), (21), (22), (23) and (27), the sum of the present values
of oligopolist i and labour union i, (32) and (33), is obtained as follows:
Fk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ, Rko) + Uk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, Rku)
= P
(
̟k, ψ˜, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
o
)
+W
(
̟k, ψ˜, γ, ǫ, λ, R
i
o
)
=
AiT b(π + v)
r + (1− a)λz˜
−
Rio +R
i
u
r
=
AiT b(ψ˜)
(
F (li, ϕ− zi)
1−1/ǫ −̟kli − ϕs+̟k l˜ + ϕs
)
r + (1− a)λz˜
−
Rio +R
i
u
r
=
y˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
1−1/ǫb(ψ˜)AiT
r + (1− a)λz˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
−
Rio +R
i
u
r
, for which
∂(Fk + Uk)
∂̟k
=
∂
∂̟k
[
y˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
1−1/ǫb(ψ˜)AiT
r + (1− a)λz˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)
]
=
y˜1−1/ǫb(ψ˜)AiT
r + (1− a)λz˜
{[(
1−
1
ǫ
)
y˜w
y˜
+
b′(ψ˜)
b(ψ˜)
ψ˜̟
]
+
(a− 1)λz˜w
r + (1− a)λz˜
}
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=
y˜1−1/ǫb(ψ˜)AiT
r + (1− a)λz˜
∆(̟k, n, γ, ǫ, λ) with
∆(̟k, n, γ, ǫ, λ)
.
=
[
1−
1
ǫ
+
b′(ψ˜)
b(ψ˜)
ψ˜
n
]
y˜w
y˜︸︷︷︸
−
+
(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
a− 1)λz˜w
r + (1− a)λz˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
. (58)
Noting (32) and (33), the equilibrium conditions (38) become
0 =
dFk
d̟k
=
∂Fk
∂̟k
+
∂Fk
∂Rko︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1/r
∂Rko
∂̟k
=
∂Fk
∂̟k
−
1
r
∂Rko
∂̟k
,
0 =
dUk
d̟k
=
∂Uk
∂̟k
+
∂Uk
∂Rku︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1/r
∂Rku
∂̟k
=
∂Uk
∂̟k
−
1
r
∂Rku
∂̟k
.
These equations are equivalent to
∂Rku
∂̟k
= r
∂Uk
∂̟k
,
∂Rko
∂̟k
= r
∂Fk
∂̟k
. (59)
Given (35), (58) and (59), one obtains
∂Gk
∂̟k
∣∣∣∣
̟ζ = ̟ and A˜ζ = A˜ for ζ ∈ [0, 1]
=
1
r
(
∂Rku
∂̟k
+
∂Rko
∂̟k
)
=
∂Uk
∂̟k
+
∂Fk
∂̟k
=
∂(Uk + Fk)
∂̟k
=
y˜1−1/ǫb(ψ˜)AiT
r + (1− a)λz˜
∆(̟k, n, γ, ǫ, λ). (60)
Conditions (37) are equivalent to the maximization of the Lagrangean
Lk = Gk(̟k, ̟−k, n, γ, ǫ, λ) + ξk[1− ϕ− l˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)]
by the wage ̟k, where the multiplier ξk is subject to the conditions
ξk[1− ϕ− l˜(̟k, γ, ǫ, λ)] = 0, ξk ≥ 0. (61)
The first-order and second-order conditions for this maximization are
∂Lk
∂̟k
∣∣∣∣
̟ζ = ̟ and A˜ζ = A˜ for ζ ∈ [0, 1]
=
∂Gk
∂̟k
∣∣∣∣
̟ζ = ̟ and A˜ζ = A˜ for ζ ∈ [0, 1]
−ξk l˜w
=
y˜1−1/ǫb(ψ˜)AiT
r + (1− a)λz˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∆− ξk l˜w︸︷︷︸
−
= 0,
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∂∆
∂̟k
< 0 ⇔
∂2Gk
∂̟2k
< 0 ⇔ ξk = 0.
Given (61), these are equivalent to
l˜ < 1− ϕ ⇔ ∆ = 0 with
∂∆
∂̟k
< 0,
l˜ = 1− ϕ ⇔ ξ > 0 ⇔ ∆ = ξk︸︷︷︸
+
l˜w︸︷︷︸
−
r + (1− a)λz˜
AiT (y˜/c)1−1/ǫ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0.
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